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INVENTORY DYNAMICS: MARKET POWER MEASURES 
WHEN INPUTS ARE CAPITAL GOODS 
Lynn Hunnicutt and David Aadland 
ABSTRACT 
111 
This paper incorporates inventory dynamics into an analysis of market power. A Coumot 
duopoly model of competition is presented in which firms account for the effects of current 
choices on their competitors' current actions on future actions (both their own and their 
competitors '). We show that measures of market power which ignore inventory dynamics 
produce biased estimates of true market power, although the direction of the bias cannot be 
theoretically determined. We then apply the model to the beef packing industry using data 
on cattle stocks and slaughter from 1948-1999. Our estimates suggest that static measures 
underestimate true market power levels. 
INVENTORY DYNAMICS: MARKET POWER MEASURES 
WHEN INPUTS ARE CAPITAL GOODS* 
1 Introduction 
Many studies of market power are based on measures derived from a static model of competition. 
In examining market power, the Department of Justice relies on the Lerner index and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index, both of which are derived from a model of competition that assumes 
that firms maximize a separate profit function each period. The possibility of inter-period (dynamic) 
effects is not easily accounted for in these standard measures. yet we know that current period output 
choices may affect future period possibilities, through inventory dynamics. If there is a lag in input 
production, decisions regarding how much input to use in one period may affect how much is 
available in the future. Market power measures that account for these inventory dynamics will thus 
more accurately describe competition in a given industry. Using a duopoly model of competition, 
we provide an exact characterization of how inventory dynamics affect market power measures. We 
then apply our model to the beef packing industry and demonstrate that ignoring inventory dynamics 
does indeed lead to biased estimates of market power. 
There is a large literature concerning market power in beef packing. The proliferation of 
research on this issue is understandable, given that the four-firm concentration ratio in beef packing 
has increased from about 36% to over 80% since 1980 (Capps Jr., Love, Williams and Adams 1999). 
Most investigations assume that packing firms make production decisions to maximize the profits 
that they earn in each production period. (See, for example, Schroeter (1987), Schroeter and Azzam 
(1990), Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), Muth and Wohlgenant (1998), Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 
(1993), Azzam and Park (1993), and Weliwita and Azzam (1996) for exceptions.) Beefpacking 
firms are assumed not to consider the effect of current period choices on future profitability. Given 
the large literature that treats cattle stocks as capital goods (Jarvis 1974; Nerlove and Fornari 1998; 
Paarsch 1985; Rosen, Murphy, and Scheinkman 1994; Rucker, Burt, and LaFrance 1984; and Trapp 
1986), such an omission is surprising. This paper demonstrates that ignoring intertemporal 
considerations likely leads to inaccurate descriptions of competition in beef packing, and may lead 
to erroneous conclusions regarding the presence or absence of market power. 
Schroeter (1987) is a clear example of the type of model commonly used to estimate 
market power in beef packing. He uses a standard model of Cournot competition in which 
the first-order necessary conditions can be used to derive measures of market power in the 
input and output market. These measures are then estimated using price and output 
*We thank DeeVon Bailey for helpful conversations regarding this work. 
(input) data, and inferences regarding market power are made. Because the approach is 
based on the classic Cournot model, it implicitly assumes that the firm's maximization 
problem is solved each period, using current period information only. We will define market 
power measures which ignore cattle growth and stock dynamics "myopic". 
(Rosen et al. 1994) provide a model that helps to explain the regular cycle in U.S. 
cattle stocks. They suggest that forward-looking, rational cattle producers when faced with 
lengthy cattle production lags (due to relatively slow reproduction times) and changes in 
demand and supply conditions act in such a way as to produce one of " ... the most periodic 
[of all] economic time series." In their model , it is recognized that the future stock of cattle 
depends on the number of head culled from the herd this period , and that these stock effects 
should influence current decisions. We believe that it is only reasonable that packers are 
also aware of this intertemporal link between current culling decisions and future stocks, 
and thus will account for this relationship in their decision-making process. 
Even in the short run, when stock growth through births may be ignored, dynamic 
considerations may matter to packers. Since cattle that are kept on feed continue to grow, 
packers may decide to keep a particular pen of cattle on feed for another few days because 
the additional weight gain more than offsets the cost of feed. Thus, even given a fixed 
number of cattle available for slaughter , stock growth rates may affect packer decisions. 
Such intertemporal constraints are ignored in models of competition which posit silnple 
profit maximization each period. It turns out that incorporating stock growth into the 
packers ' decisions has important theoretical implications for measuring market power. Most 
notably, studies that ignore cattle stock dynamics may conclude that market power exists 
(or does not exist) , when stock growth considerations are actually driving firm behavior. 
There have been a few papers which consider the appropriateness of using the standard 
Cournot framework to model dynamic competition. (Dockner 1992) demonstrates that 
static conjectural variations models (such as that used by (Schroeter 1987)) are equivalent 
to "open-loop" solutions to a dynamic game.1 "Closed-loop" solutions, on the other hand, 
lead to conclusions about market power that are different from those derived using a static 
model of competition. This is true even in the steady state. (Corts 1999) points out 
that estimates of market power from a Cournot-type model (static or dynamic) will not 
1 An "open-loop" solution assumes that a firm's current period choice may affect its rival's current period 
choice and its own future choices , but not its rival 's futw·e choices. A "closed-loop" solution allows all three 
effects to be non-zero. 
2 
accurately describe conduct unless firms behave as Cournot competitors. If firm behavior 
is not as the Cournot model postulates , then conclusions derived from estimating a model 
of Cournot competition may not be accurate. 
The weaknesses of the Cournot model are well known, yet analyses based on Cournot 
assumptions continue to be used by many academic economists and policymakers because 
of the relatively straightforward implications and limited data requirements. Given that 
firms do behave as Cournot competitors, our model suggests an extension which can be 
estimated and which will lead to a more accurate assessment of market power. 
2 Model 
2.1 The basics 
3 
We generalize a model developed by (Kamien , Levhari and Mirman 1985) to include the 
possibility that firms account for stock growth in their current period maximization problem. 
In order to generate closed form solutions, we model two packers (i = 1, 2) , each choosing 
how many cattle x i to purchase and process in each production period. 2 Without loss of 
generality, we assume that live cattle are transformed pound for pound into output (boxed 
beef). Let X = xl + x 2 denote the aggregate live cattle purchases and the output that is 
supplied in the period. The price of boxed beef is given by the inverse demand function 
Pb = p(X). Processing costs incurred by each packer in transforming the raw input into 
output are c(xi). Live cattle are purchased from ranchers following the supply function 
Wm = w(X). The growth characteristics of cattle stocks (8) are represented by the function 
J(8, X) , so that 8 t = J(8t - 1 - X t - l ) . This function is general enough to allow for both 
stock growth through weight gain (Same number of cattle, each larger in size) , and through 
birt hs (larger number of cattle).3 Following the literature on cattle growth in feedlots , we 
assume J' (.) > 0, and J"(. ) < O. 
The objective for firm i is to choose x i each period to maximize the present value of the 
sum of per-period operating profits , 7ft (Pb , wm ) = p(Xt)xi - w(Xt)xi - C(xi) , subject to the 
growth characteristics of the live cattle stock, and the actions of rival firm j. This value 
2The results generalize to competition between more than two packers, but create additional complexity 
without additional insight . 
3There is a three-year lag between the decision to retain a cow and the sale (or retention) of her offspring. 
In the theoretical section, we account for this by defining a "period" to be three years. In our estimating 




V(St) = L (3t Wt (Pb , W m ) 
t=l , (1) 
s.t. St+l = f (St - X t), So , Xo given 
where {3 = 1/ (1 + r) and r is the market rate of interest. 
There are three effects to consider in this model. The first is the competition effect -
the quantity choice made by firm i in the current period affects the current period profits of 
firm j (i =1= j) and therefore firm j's current period production choice. This is the standard 
Cournot effect. The next two effects arise because the quantity chosen by firm i affects 
live cattle supplies available in future periods. We call these "dynamic" externalities. The 
direct dynamic externality (DDE) arises because the choice of xi in the current period affects 
the next period's stock and therefore firm i's own discounted profit stream. The indirect 
dynamic externality (IDE) occurs because the choice of xi in the current period affects next 
period 's stock and therefore affects firm j's discounted profit stream. Furthermore, firm i 
assumes that firm j will react to this intertemporal stock effect on its profits. 
As is standard in oligopoly models , we assume that firm i believes that its rival's quantity 
, . ( . S) . dx j (x i S) is given by x J = x J x'l., . To ease notation, let rJ == dx i ' denote the rate at which 
firm j ' s quant ity adjusts with xi, and let R i == dX/dx i = 1 + r j denote the rate at which 
market output adjusts with xi . Finally, let c and TJ denote the price elasticity of demand 
(-p(X)/Xp'(X)) and the input cost elasticity of supply (w(X)/Xw'(X)) respectively. It 
is common to express the rate at which market output adjusts with x i in elasticity form , 
()i = i~;: = ~ R i; thus ()i is the conjectural elasticity parameter for firm i. 
2.2 Deriving the dynamic market power measures 
Following (Kamien et al. 1985), we study the equilibrium market outcome under a "closed-
loop" solution to equation 1. In a closed-loop solution, both firms consider the impact of 
their actions on rival behavior (i.e. the competitive effect) and on the future stocks available 
for production (i.e. the dynamic externalities).4 The derivation of the forward-looking 
market equilibrium condit ion follows directly from (Kamien et al. 1985) and is presented 
4In contrast , an "open-loop" equilibrium solution does not include the IDE - the effect of i 's cw-rent 
period choice on j's future choices. 
in an appendix. Here, we interpret the equilibrium solution and discuss its implications for 
measuring market power in the beef packing industry. 
The closed-loop output policy will identify each firm's optimal quantity as a function 
of the cattle stock, xi = xi(S).5 Because firm i understands that j's quantity decision is 
also conditional on S, the closed loop conjecture (firm i's belief about what firm j considers 
in its choice) is xj (xi (S), S) at the optimum. Aggregate quantity in the market, according 
to firm i is thus X (S) = xi (S) + xj (xi (S), S) . In the appendix, we derive the following 
equilibrium condition 
(2) 
for i = 1,2, where the functional dependence on S is implied, At = p(Xt ) - w(Xt ) -
c'(x~) + [P'(Xt ) - w'(Xt )] x~Bit, At+l is similarly defined, and Nt+ 1 = [P(Xt+ 1 ) - w(Xt+ 1 ) -
'( i )] (dX{+l) C x t+ 1 ---;rs-. 
Equation 2 is the analog to a standard investment rule. In effect, this equation says 
that firm i equates marginal profits across periods. The left-hand side is the marginal value 
from slaughtering the last unit of the stock in the current period. Notice that it includes 
the Cournot effect, Bit. The right-hand side is the marginal value of foregone slaughter, 
that is of the marginal investment in the cattle stock, which is given on the right-hand side 
of equation 2. This term includes the discounted growth in the stock f3 l' (.) and the future 
profits earned from slaughtering the animal next period.6 Both dynamic externalities are 
included in this model , as firm i accounts for the direct effect that its current quantity 
choice has on the future stock of cattle and thus its own future profitability (At+1 ), as well 
as the indirect effect of its choice on the future quantity of cattle firm j slaughters (Nt+1). 
Equation 2 can be expressed in a more familiar way as the dynamic closed-loop Lerner 
index (derived in the appendix), 
5This function is not to be confused with firm i's belief about firm j's quantity, xj(Xi, s). 
6Recall that in this section, the time from birth to maturity is defined as one "period". 





Wh r - f3f'(St - Xt) (~) [A N] ere - p(xt) R~+l t+l - t+l· 
The first right-hand term -B~/ct is the Lerner index that is commonly estimated in non-
forward looking models of market power. The second term, r represents the consideration 
firm i gives to the effect of its current period choices on the stock available for slaughter in 
future periods. Assuming that the second term is not zero, the myopic measure of market 
power ( -B~/ ct) does not accurately describe the amount by which firms are able to raise 
price above marginal cost. 
The myopic index accurately describes market power in a few special cases. If firms 
do not care about future returns, f3 = 0, or when the number of calves born just replaces 
the number of head culled from the herd, 1'(-) = 0, equation 3 collapses to the myopic 
Lerner index. As noted in (Dockner 1992) , the term [At+l - N t+1] is extremely unlikely to 
be zero, since it includes the Cournot effect, the DDE and the IDE. Note also that the 
Lerner index is equal to zero in a competitive market, which occurs when Ri = Bi = 0, 
i.e. when individual firm output decisions do not affect market quantity X and the firm 
recognizes this. Under perfect competition the forward-looking Lerner index is equivalent 
to the myopic index (both are zero) because firms cannot be assured that they will be the 
claimants of the returns from investing in the stock. 
We argue that these conditions are not likely to arise in beef packing, with its small 
number of firms and well-understood (and cyclical) cattle supply conditions. Because of 
this, estimates of market power based on current period data will probably be biased. Of 
course, an empirical test of this model is needed to verify or disprove this conjecture. 
Equation 2 can also be manipulated to measure market power in the input market. Let 
MC denote the difference between marginal revenue product of live-cattle input and the 
input price , normalized by the input price. Then, as we derive in the appendix; 
(4) 
Wh J\ - f3f'(St - x t) ( R~ ) [A N] ere L.l - w(Xt ) R~+l t+l - t+l· 
As with the Lerner index, MC is equal to the myopic measure B~/TJt plus an adjust-
ment which accounts for the value of investing in the stock. The adjustment includes the 
discounted value of next period cattle stock f3f'(~)~;)R~, the direct dynamic externality 
w t t+l 
(the effect firm i's current period choice has on future stock levels) At+ 1, and the indi-
rect dynamic externality, N t+1 , the effect of firm i's current period choice on future stocks 
and therefore on firm j's future production choices. Also as with the Lerner index, this 
adjustment term is unlikely to be zero in the beef packing industry. Models that do not 
include the discounted profit stream in the firm's maximization problem will not include 
this adjustment , and may therefore draw inaccurate conclusions regarding market power. 
2.3 Determining the bias in myopic market power measures 
7 
The forward looking market power measures given in equations 3 and 4 indicate that single-
period models are likely to produce biased estimates of market power. Unfortunately, the 
direction of the bias cannot be determined theoretically. We see that the forward-looking 
Lerner index (£C) is larger (smaller) than the corresponding myopic measure (£S) if and only 
if the adjustment term (r) is positive (negative). Recall that r = (3f'~f~~)Xt) (R~l) [At+l-
Nt+1]. The first term in this equation, (3!'(·)/p(Xt ) is positive. R!t!R~+l is also positive if 
when market output rises (falls) with firm i's output in the current period, it will continue 
to rise (fall) with firm i's output in the future. 
Thus , the myopic Lerner index is biased downward (upward) if and only if 
(5) 
Using basic (but somewhat tedious) algebra, we see that the left-hand side of this in-
equality can be rearranged to 
From the second-order conditions for profit maximization, which are assumed to hold, the 
second term in this sum is negative. The sign of the first term is ambiguous, although likely 
to be positive. The ambiguity arises at two points. First , it is possible that p(Xt+1) -
w(Xt+1) - C'(X~+l) is negative. Assuming that V'C) is not too negative, it can be shown 
that p(X) -w(X) -c'(x i ) is positive (using the first order necessary condition, equation A.2 
from the appendix) . 7 Second, the size of firm j's reaction to a change in stock levels (ddXS~±l ) 
t±l 
cannot be theoretically predicted. If firm j does not overcompensate for changes in stock 
7In particular, when V'(·) > (pl(Xhf~/.~X))x i , p(X) - w(X) - c'(xi ) is positive. 
levels, ddSX{+l will be smaller than one, and (given that V'(·) is large enough) the first term 
t+l 
is positive.8 Since, under reasonable assumptions, we have a positive and a negative term 
in the bias, both its size and direction are ambiguous. 
Similar calculations can be performed on the myopic input measure of market power. 
Using the same techniques as for the Lerner index, we can show that 
(7) 
Notice that since both pC) and wC) are positive, the bias in the input market power measure 
will have the same sign as the bias in the Lerner index. As before, signing this bias in M S 
is an empirical matter , since At+1 - N t+ 1 contains a negative term and a (likely) positive 
term. 
3 Estimating the model 
3.1 Deriving the Empirical Specification 
The results presented above suggest that investigation of market power based on myopic 
conjectural variations models are biased. 9 This section applies the forward-looking model 
of competition to data from the U.S. beef-packing industry. 
Our first task is to derive econometric equations based on the theoretical conditions 
provided above. As noted, a single "period" as defined above represents three years. 
Since we employ annual data, we specify the following three-period lag structure for stock 
dynamics 
St = 1'1 St-1 + 1'3 St-3 (8) 
where 1'1 = (1 - 8)(1 - as), 1'3 = (1 - 8)2(1 - ao)O.5g, 8 is the death rate, g is the birthing 
rate, as is the cull rate for cows (i.e., fraction of the cow stock sent to market), and ao is 
the cull rate for calves. The intuition behind (8) is clear and follows closely the laws of 
BIt is not possible to determine the size of dx j IdS, even in the steady state. It is possible to derive an 
expression for dx j IdS , but this expression may take on values greater than or less than one. 
9This simple model of Cow-not duopoly has provided an exact characterization of the bias in estimates 
based on a myopic model. If there are more than two firms in the industry, and depending on the particular 
way that cattle stocks evolve , this exact characterization will change, although the main result will continue 
to hold. 
8 
motion for cattle inventories in (Rosen 1987) and (Chavas 2000). The total stock of cows 
can change for two reasons: (1) some cows from period t - 1 may die or get sent to slaughter 
(i.e. , culled from the stock) and (2) calves born from cows bred in period t - 3 that do not 
die can be retained for addition to the breeding stock in period t.1° 
Given (8) , the packer's equilibrium first-order condition is 
{3'1~ [A dXt+1 - N 1 
R i t+1 dB t+1 t+1 t+1 
(9) 
2 2 . 
+{3 '1~ [A dXt+2 - N 1 R i t+2 dB t+2 t+2 t+2 
3 3 . [ 1 +{3 ('1 + '3)~ A dXt+3 _ N Ri t+3 dB t+3 t+3 t+3 
9 
where A and N are as defined in the theoretical section. The intuition behind this equation 
is the san1e as for (2) but it is slightly more complex given the three-period lag nature of 
the stock dynamics. As before, if packers are forward looking, {3 will not be equal to zero , 
and static market-power estimates (which rely on estimates from the equation At = 0) will 
be biased. Our ultimate goal is to compare estimates of equation 9 with and without {3 set 
equal to zero to determine the size and direction of the bias. 
Toward this end, we estimate five equations: the slaughter-stock relationship, the 
wholesale demand for nonfed beef, the input supply of cows, the packer's equilibrium first-
order condition with {3 set to zero (At = 0) and with {3 allowed to be greater than zero 
(equation 9). We begin by specifying the amount purchased by packers as a given proportion 
of available stocks: 
(10) 
This equation will be used later in estimating the packer's equilibrium first-order condition. 
Next , we assume that the demand for beef can be represented by a log-linear inverse 
lOThis specicfication for (8) simplifies the rancher's problem by assuming that the cull rates for cows and 
calves are constant over time. Clearly this is an abstraction from reality, but one that greatly simplifies our 
analysis. The more complicated problem of solving the entire rancher's dynamic optimization problem is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
10 
demand function: 
In order to avoid modeling feedlot behavior , we use data on "non-fed" beef only. Cows 
culled from the herd some years after they have been in the breeding stock do not go through 
the "finishing" process , which involves approximately 9 months in a feedlot on concentrated 
feed. Thus , these cows are defined as non-fed. 
We hypothesize that the demand curve for (11) is downward-sloping (b1 < 0), nonfed 
beef is a normal good (b2 < 0), chicken and pork are substitutes for nonfed beef (b3 > 0 
and b4 > 0), and there has been a gradual downward trend in the price of nonfed beef over 
time (b5 < 0). 
The (inverse) input supply of cows is also assumed to be log-linear: 
(12) 
The literature on cattle supply is mixed regarding the nature of the short-run supply re-
sponse in the cattle industry. Some theoretical studies suggest that the supply curve may 
be negatively sloped if the shock to demand is sufficiently permanent ((Jarvis 1974), (Rosen 
1987)). Others , however , have found evidence that the supply response may instead be 
positive ((Paarsch 1985) , (Mundlak and Huang 1996)). (Aadland and Bailey 2000) in a 
recent study found that the short-run supply response for cows is generally positive for 
shocks (transitory or permanent) that impact the relative price of cows (non-fed) to heifers 
(fed). Therefore, we include the price of heifers to isolate shocks that impact the relative 
price of cows. We then hypothesize that the supply curve for cows (conditional on heifer 
prices) is upward sloping (C1 > 0), cows are substitutes for heifers (C2 > 0), and there has 
been a gradual downward trend in the price of cows over time (C3 < 0). 
The last econometric equation is the equilibrium first-order condition for packers (9). 
With some substitution and assuming symmetry across packers, equation 9 can be written 
more simply as 
(13) 
11 
where e is the conjectural elasticity parameter defined above and 
Exclusion of r t from (13) produces what we refer to as the "myopic" conjectural variations 
estimate. The primary goal of this paper is to establish that estimates of e from models 
that exclude the r t term, or equivalently assume that f3 = 0, are biased. 
We use aggregate time series data from 1948 to 1999 to estimate the model. Our sample 
begins in 1948 because (i) heifer and cow slaughter were not reported separately until 1944 
and (ii ) in 1947, the spread between farm prices for cull cows and wholesale prices for nonfed 
beef was abnormally high. The data are taken from Agricultural Statistics, an annual 
publication of the Economic Research Serivce branch of the United States Department of 
Agriculture. As mentioned above, we focus our attention on the stock of cows (8), which 
is measured by the number of cows and heifers that have calved as of January 1. Total cow 
slaughter (X) is given by the total number of federally inspected slaughtered cows over the 
year. At the farm level, we use the market price for commercial cows (w) at two different 
markets. Prior to 1968, the USDA reports the market price at Chicago. After 1968, the 
USDA reports the market price paid to farmers at Omaha. For the years 1964 through 
1968, both series are reported and produce very similar prices, as the law of one price would 
predict. For heifers (ph), we use the average price received by farmers for calves, which 
is an average price paid to farmers across the states in a given year. We are unaware of 
any historical data on retail prices for nonfed beef (p). However, we were able to obtain 
average wholesale prices of commercial dressed steer beef from 1944 through 1988. After 
1988 the USDA stopped reporting wholesale prices for dressed carcasses because packing 
technology had changed, and beef was no longer sold in this way.1 1 For the post 1988 
period, we obtained (through the USDA) the wholesale canner-cutter dressed, non-fed, 
boxed-beef price out of Omaha, NE. When spliced together, these two series serve as our 
measure for the price of nonfed beef. The final three series are the price of broiler chickens 
(pc), the average price received by farmers for hogs (pp) , and U.S. disposable income (di). 
All nominal series are deflated using the US consumer price index for all goods and services 
HIn the early 1970s, packing firms began producing "boxed beef". Rather than selling whole carcasses, 
packers processed the carcass into primal cuts and sold boxes of a given cut. For example, wholesalers now 
purchase a box of hindquarters, rather than the entire carcass. 
12 
(1967 = 100). 
3.2 Results 
Our estimation is completed in two stages. In stage one, we estimate equations 10, 11 
and 12. Then in stage two , conditional on these estimated elasticities and the estimated 
slaughter-stock slope parameter, we estimate the conjectural variations elasticity e in (9) for 
two cases: (i) with myopic packer behavior and (ii) with forward-looking packer behavior.12 
First , we generate estimates from equation 10 using the Cochrane-Orcutt iterated pro-
cedure to correct for first-order autocorrelated errors. Endogeneity of period t cow stocks 
is not an issue because the stock of cows in period t is predetermined by decisions made 
in the previous period. Equations 11 and 12, on the other hand, are estimated using 
instrumental variables (also with an autocorrelation correction) because of the endogene-
ity associated with In (X). The set of instruments for (12) are the remaining exogenous 
variables , the stock of heifers and cows in period t , and once-lagged In(X). The set of 
inst ruments for (11) are the remaining exogenous variables, the stock of calves , heifers and 
cows in period t , and once-lagged In(X). Lastly, the estimates for (13) are also generated 
with autocorrelation-corrected instrumental variables technique. The set of instruments 
for (13) include the linear time trend , box-beef dummy, the stock of heifers and cows in 
period t , and the once- and twice-lagged values of (CIWt - b1Pt). The results are presented 
in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
Begin by focusing on the results in the first three columns of Table 1.13 All the signs 
of the estimated coefficients agree with our initial hypotheses and all but the box-beef 
12Ideally, these equations would be estimated as a system of equations with the appropriate cross-equation 
restrictions imposed. However , given the nature of the optimizing equation for the packers , we found that 
full maximum likelihood and generalized method of moments estimation tend to choose () = 1, b1 = 1 and 
Cl = 1, generating a perfect fit for the packer 's first order-condition . We consider these unreasonable demand 
and supply elasticities that result simply because of the nature of the first-order condition. We therefore 
instead rely on estimates from the two-stage procedure. Furthermore, given that we are only interested in 
showing that models based on myopic conjectural variations produce biased estimates, we are willing to suffer 
the loss in efficiency caused by using this two-stage procedure. The loss in efficiency from single-equation 
estimation and generated regressors would be a concern, however , when performing hypothesis tests. 
13The results in the last column of Table 1 are conditioned upon the following parameter values for cattle 
stock dynamics: f3 = 0.96, 9 = 0.85, 8 = 0.1 , CiS = 0.2 and Cia = 0.6 . We experimented with different 
reasonable values for these parameters and found the differences between to the myopic and forward-looking 
estimates of () to be robust . 
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dummy are statistically significant. The primary coefficients of interest are al, b1 and Cl. 
The estimate for al implies that for an increase in the aggregate stock of cows by 1000, 
cow slaughter will increase by 396 animals. As we estimated inverse supply and demand 
functions , the reciprocal of b1 gives the price elasticity of supply, and the reciprocal of Cl 
gives the price elasticity of demand. The supply elasticity suggests the supply of cull cows 
(holding constant the price of heifers) is quite responsive to changes in the price of cows 
(i .e., an elasticity of approximately 4.2). The demand elasticity suggests that demand for 
nonfed beef is slightly elastic with respect to its price (i.e. , an elasticity of approximately 
-1.2). 
The final two columns in Table 1 report the conjectural elasticity estimates for myopic 
and forward-looking packers. 14 The myopic estimate of the conjectural elasticity paramater 
is () = 0.352 and is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The forward-looking 
estimate is approximately 33% larger (() = 0.467), is also statistically significant , and shows 
that (at least using aggregate US time series data) myopic conjectural variation estimates 
appear to be downwardly biased, implying that packers are exerting more market power 
than myopic estimates would suggest. According to the work in our theoretical section, 
the myopic market power measure is biased downward if and only if the direct dynamic 
externality (captured in At+1 ) is larger than the indirect dynamic externality (captured by 
N t+1 ). Since our results suggest a downward bias in () , our findings support the notion that 
direct dynamic effects outweigh indirect dynamic effects. Once again, note that while the 
levels of our market power estimates are of interest , the signicant conclusion is that these 
two estimates, derived from the same data set and estimating techniques, are different. 
Ignoring stock dynamics appears to lead to inaccurate estimates of market power. 
4 Conclusion 
Increased concentration in the beef packing industry continues to be a major policy concern 
in the United States. Previous studies of market power in beef packing ignore the intrinsic 
growth characteristics of cattle stocks , and thus fail to consider the shadow value of investing 
14These conjectural variations elasticity estimates are similar to those found by (Bhuyan and Lopez 1997), 
and (Schroeter and Azzam 1991). They differ from estimates obtained in (Schroeter 1987) , and (Azzam 
and Schroeter 1995). We feel , however , that it is more appropriate to compare the conjectural variations 
elasticity estimates we generate with each other, rather than with estimates from other studies, because 
other estimates are generally derived using different data sets and/or estimation techniques. 
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in this stock. We present a simple forward-looking Cournot duopoly model illustrating the 
bias introduced into both the "standard" Lerner index and the measure of oligopsony mar-
ket power. We also show that this bias cannot be theoretically signed, so that determining 
whether existing measures over- or understate market power is an empirical matter. How-
ever, as long as firms do not completely discount the future, and have non-zero conjectures 
regarding the effect of their choices on market output, myopic measures of market power 
are expected to be biased. Using data on cattle stocks, sales and prices from 1948-1999, 
we demonstrate that myopic measures of market power are indeed biased. In our data set , 
myopic market power measures understate the degree of packer market power. 
A Derivation of Forward-Looking Market Power Measures 
Firm i's closed loop conjecture of firm j's quantity is xj(xi,S). The Bellman equation 
representation of the firm value function is 
V(S) = m~x {[P(xi + xj(xi, s)) - w(xi + xj(xi, s))]xi - c(xi) + (3V(f(S - xi - xj(xi, s)))} 
x~ 
(A.l) 
Notice that firm j's choice depends both on xi (the Cournot externality), and on s (the 
dynamic externality). We take the derivative of V(S) with respect to xi to obtain the 
first-order necessary condition 
[P(X) - w(X)] + [P'(X) - w'(X)]Rixi - c'(xi) 
- (3V'(f(S - X))f'(S - X)Ri = 0 
(A.2) 
where X = xi + xj (xi , s). Assuming second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied, there 
exists a function xi(S) which solves equation A.2 and maximizes A.I. Inserting this solution 
into equation A.l , differentiating with respect to s , and using equation A.2 obtains 
V'(S) = [P'(X(S)) - w'(X(Sll]xi(S): 
+ f3V'(f(S - X(S)))j'(S - X(S)) [1 - ~~l (A.3) 
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where X(S) = xi(S)+xj (xi(S), s). Solving for f3V'C)j' (.) from equation A.2 and simplifying 
yields 
V'(S) = [p'(X(S)) - w'(X(S))] xi(S) 
p(X(S)) - w(X(S)) - c'(xi(S)) ( _ dXj ) 
+ R i 1 dS 
(A.4) 
To obtain the forward-looking equilibrium condition, evaluate equation A.4 at f(S - x 1 -x2 ) 
instead of s , let X t+1(S), X~+l(S), 0;+1' and ct+1 denote the values of X , xi(S), Oi, and c 
evaluated at St+1 = f(S - xi - xj), and substitute this value for V'(S) into the necessary 
condition for an optimum, equation A.2 , to obtain 
p(Xt ) - w(Xt) - c'(xD + [p'(Xt ) - w'(Xt )] x~~ = f3!'(S - Xt) 
x l (p(X'+ll - w(Xt+1l - c'(x;+1l) (1 - d~';l ) + [p'(X,+ll - w'(X,+ll] xl+1 R:+1] Rl~l 
(A.5) 
From A.5 , the (closed-loop) price-cost margin can be written as 
£C _ p(Xt) - (w(Xt ) + w'(Xt)x~~) - c'(x~) 
t - p(Xt ) 
p'(Xt ) i i H 
= - p(Xt) xtR't + p(Xt) 
(A.6) 
where 
It is straightforward to show that 
(A.7) 
Let MC denote the measure of oligopsony power, which is given by the difference between 
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marginal revenue product and the input price, normalized by the input price. Manipulating 
equation A.5 we obtain 
Me _ p(Xt ) + p'(Xt)x~.m - c'(xD - w(Xt) 
t - w(Xt) 
= w'(Xt)x~.m + ~ 
w(Xt) w(Xt) 
(A.8) 
Manipulating this equation we see that 
(A.9) 
B Derivation of the Estimating Equation 
Because the firm is forward looking, it accounts for the biological constraint present in 
the market for fed cattle. In the theory section, we illustrated the problem in using a 
static fr amework to estimate an inherently dynamic problem using a simple one-period lag 
structure for cattle stock dynamics. The Bellman equation approach used in that section 
gives the most straightforward representation of the firm 's problem. Unfortunately, the lag 
structure in cattle stock dynamics involves at least three periods, which makes the Bellman 
equation approach quite complex. To generate our estimating equation, we will use the 
more general approach of substituting the stock dynamic constraints into the firm's problem 
and solving the firm 's problem directly. The results are the same as would be generated 
by a Bellman equation approach. 
A second concern, which we do not address in this paper is the derivation of the rancher's 
supply function. Solving the rancher 's problem and the packer's problem simultaneously 
could lead to interesting market outcomes, and is the subject of ongoing research. Here, 
we are simply demonstrating that static measures of market power may be biased, and 
attempting to determine whether the bias is positive or negative. 
As noted , the firm 's problem is 
00 
m~x L,6t [{p(Xt ) - w (Xt)}x~ - c(xDJ 
X t t=O 
s.t. St = 8St- 1 + "'(St-3, Xo, So given 
There are four terms of interest from this discounted stream of profits: 
,6t [{p(Xt ) - w (Xt )} x~ - c(xDJ 
t+l [ } . . J +,6 {p(Xt+1 ) - w (Xt+1) x~+l - c(x~+l) 
+,6t+2 [{p(Xt+2) - w (Xt+2)} X~+2 - C(X~+2) J 
+,6t+3 [{P(Xt+3) - w (Xt+3)} x~+3 - C(X~+3)J 




Where Pt+k == p(Xt+k) and P~+k == p' (Xt+k) and similarly for w. To estimate this 
equation, we need to know how future market input usage changes with firm i's current 
period input usage (dXdttk), and how firm i's own future input usage depends on its current 
X t 
period input usage (dxd~:k). We can expand the second derivative as follows: 
X t 
dX~+k dX~+k dSt+k dSt dXt 
dx~ dSt+k dSt dXt dx~ 
dX~+k dSt+k i 
= - dSt+k ~Rt 
(B.3) 
Since %J(t = -1, because cattle are either slaughtered or not in period t , and every head 
not slaughtered (dXt = -1) increases the stock by exactly one head (dst = 1). We have 
defined ddxf to be F4,. To get ddx~+k , we use the following definition (which holds at firm i's 
X t St+k 
equilibrium input choice) 
X t+k = X~+k(St+k) + Xi+k(X~+k(St+k)' St+k) 
{:} dX~+k (1 + a~j ) = dXt+k _ axj 
dSt+k aX~+k dSt+k aSt+k 
dX~+k 1 [dXt+k axj] 
{:} dSt+k = R~+k dSt+k - aSt+k 
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(B.4) 









Next, we derive d~:rk. First, note that at equilibrium, X t = x~(St) +xj(x~(St),St). 
We also know that 
(B.5) 
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Finally, we can write the equation we estimate as: 
[{ '( i )} (
dXt+3 ax]) i i {' '} dXt+3] Pt+3 - Wt+3 - c x t+3 -d-- - -a-- + ~+3 x t+3 Pt+3 - W t+3 -d--St+3 St+3 St+3 
(B.6) 
defining At and Nt as in the theoretical section, we can rearrange this equation to the 
one given in the text above. 
References 
Aadland , D. and Bailey, D.: 2000, Short-run supply responses in the us beef-cattle industry. 
unpublished manuscript, Utah State University. 
Azzam, A. M. and Schroeter, J. R.: 1995, The tradeoff between oligopsony power and 
cost efficiency in horizontal consolidation: An example from beef packing, American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, 825-836. 
Azzam, A. and Park, T.: 1993, Testing for switching market conduct, Applied Economics 
25 , 795-800. 
Bhuyan, S. and Lopez , R. A.: 1997 Oligopoly power in the food and tobacco industries, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79 , 1035- 1043. 
20 
Capps Jr. , 0. , Love, H. A. , Williams, G. W. and Adams, W. L.: 1999, Examining packer 
choice of slaughter cattle procurement and pricing methods, Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Review 28, 11- 25. 
Chavas, J.-P.: 2000, On information and market dynamics: The case of the u.s. beef market , 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, 833-853. 
Corts, K.: 1999, Conduct parameters and the measurement of market power, Journal of 
Econometrics 88, 227- 250. 
Dockner , E. J.: 1992 A dynamic theory of conjectural variations, Journal of Industrial 
Economics 40 , 377- 395. 
Jarvis , L. S.: 1974, Cattle as capital goods and ranchers as portfolio managers: An appli-
cation to the argentine cattle sector , Journal of Political Economy 82 , 489-520. 
Kamien, M., Levhari , D. and Mirman, L. J.: 1985, Dynamic model of fishing: The relation-
ship to conjectural variations, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
12, 301-321. 
Koontz , S. R. , Garcia, P. and Hudson, M. A.: 1993, Meatpacker conduct in fed cattle pricing: 
An investigation of oligopsony power , A merican Journal of Agricultural Economics 
75 , 537- 548. 
Mundlak , Y. and Huang, H.: 1996, International comparison of cattle cycles , American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 , 855-868. 
Muth , M. K . and Wohlgenant , M. K.: 1998, A model of imperfect competition using 
marginal input and output prices: Application to the beef packing industry. 1998 
AAEA Meetings Selected Paper. 
Nerlove, M. and Fornari, 1.: 1998, Quasi-rational expectations, an alternative to fully ra-
tional expectations: An application to u.s. beef cattle supply, Journal of Econometrics 
83, 129-161. 
Paarsch, H. J.: 1985, Micro-economic models of beef supply, Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics 18, 636- 651. 
21 
Rosen, S.: 1987, Dynamic animal economics, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
69, 547- 557. 
Rosen, S. , Murphy, K. and Scheinkman, J.: 1994, Cattle cycles, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 102, 468-492. 
Rucker, R. R., Burt, O. R. and LaFrance, J. T.: 1984, An econometric model of cattle 
inventories, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66 , 131-144. 
Schroeter, J.: 1987, Estimating the degree of market power in the beef packing industry, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 69, 158- 162. 
Schroeter, J. and Azzam, A.: 1990, Measuring market power in multi-product oligopolies: 
the us meat industry, Applied Economics 22 , 1365-1376. 
Schroeter , J. and Azzam, A.: 1991 , Marketing margins, market power, and price uncertainty, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73 , 990-999. 
Trapp, J. N.: 1986, Investment and divestment principles with nonconstant prices and 
varying firm size applied to beef-breeding herds, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 68, 691-703. 
Weliwita, A. and Azzam, A.: 1996, Identifying implicit collusion under declining output 
demand, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 21 , 235-246. 
